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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the European Mon-
etary System (EMS) and its Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
regarded as the forerunner to European Monetary Union 
(EMU). It may contribute to understanding the nature and 
the operation of the monetary integration of the single cur-
rency area. The paper examines the reasons why the European 
Monetary System was formed in 1979, whether its crisis could 
have been avoided in the early 1990s and how the „new” ERM 
worked out. The ERM was succeeded by ERM 2 from 1999 in 
which the euro became the anchor for the other participat-
ing currencies. The global economic and financial crisis has 
brought both the structural and the operational weaknesses of 
EMU to the surface. The future of the European monetary inte-
gration is vital for Europe. The euro crisis is often perceived to 
have been caused by the global crisis. The ERM did not seem 
to have laid the groundwork for the monetary union and the 
Maastricht Treaty also has some critical points determining the 
operation of EMU in the long run. It is essential to gauge the 
euro-zone from the aspect of its vulnerability and susceptibility 
to crises to prevent a recurrence.
Keywords
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1 Introduction
The global economic and financial crisis has brought to the 
surface both the structural and the operational weaknesses of 
the concept of the monetary union. Documenting the “defects 
from birth” starts with examining the monetary system in 
Europe in the late 1970s.
The European Monetary System (EMS) was created in 1979 
by eight of the European Union [European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) at that time] member states as a prelude to monetary 
unification. Therefore it is essential to know the economic envi-
ronment in which it functioned, the way it operated. The roots of 
the current monetary integration go back to that time and to that 
system. Revealing its defects may bring us closer to having a bit 
more understanding of the euroland, and forming views of the 
monetary environment Europeans can expect to be surrounded 
by in the forthcoming period of time. Lessons are never late 
to learn. It is another question when and how the lessons can 
serve. To put it differently, given the only way what is still to be 
adjusted: the participants or the surroundings? Or does restrict-
ing the rules enable the way to remain? Additionally when it 
comes to choosing the tool it will prove again that one tool can 
be good for only one purpose meaning that an economic policy 
can pursue one goal. In its first eight years the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism of the EMS, the ERM, was characterized by rea-
lignments negotiated by all members in advance thus unilateral 
devaluations were excluded. Realignments were necessary to 
correct for differences in inflation rates. Meanwhile capital con-
trols were retained meaning free flow of capital had not been 
adopted yet, which defended the countries with weak curren-
cies from the downward pressure on their exchange rates and 
worked as an instrument for them. The period between January 
1987 and mid-1992 witnessed no realignments and the ERM 
had evolved into a de facto fixed-rate system by the late 1980s. 
Giving up the instrument of limited international capital flows 
with the exchange rates de facto fixed led to tensions within the 
system since it meant giving up either the domestic objectives 
in the member countries (the low inflation) or stable exchange 
rates. This is what is meant by one economic policy one goal. 
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Other issues like the German unification and high German infla-
tion and interest rates following it would also made other mem-
ber countries to pursue economic policies which does not serve 
their domestic goals just to keep their exchange rate parities. 
For the ERM this situation called for transiting into a monetary 
union with compatible national policies and a single currency. 
Signing the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 suggested no occurrence 
of devaluations in the short period of time before the move to a 
single currency was scheduled in 1999. Investors could capital-
ize on yield differentials and enjoy safety of facing no exchange 
rate risk at the same time. The tensions were strengthened by the 
speculators and the crisis of the ERM emerged in 1992 and later 
in 1993 again indicating its vulnerability. Despite the Treaty 
showed optimism it was viewed with skepticism in some coun-
tries, the doubts about its acceptance reflected lack of support 
by the general public. I acknowledge the benefit of hindsight 
yet the lessons deserve consideration. This paper will argue that 
underlying structural flaws of the monetary system preceding 
monetary union, ignorance of early warning signs and the impli-
cations of its crisis for the viability of the three-stage Maastricht 
process have a great impact on the viability of the Monetary 
Union. It is true that the situation in 1992 was exceptionally 
unstable coinciding circumstances (German reunification and 
high interest rates, recession in Europe, uncertainties around 
the referendum about the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and in 
France) were easier to blame for the crisis than exploring the 
underlying structural system flaws or revealing that the goal 
of the Single Europe and single currency is a highly political 
endeavour.  Instead of an optimistic assessment of the prospects 
for EMU timely corrections should have been made.  When 
the euro was born, there was a great wave of sanguineness in 
Europe. The flood of money that was poured to Spain and other 
countries regarded as safe investments fostered housing bubbles 
and trade deficits. The global financial crisis put an end to the 
flood leaving swamps behind. The financial crisis turned into a 
fiscal crisis. Austerity measures were introduced as a response 
causing a fall in investor confidence and political instability 
meaning that the policies demanded by the European Central 
Bank are likely impossible to pursue.
2 The Path to Monetary Union
On December 10 1991, the leaders of the European Union 
countries met at Maastricht Netherlands to propose amend-
ments to the Treaty of Rome putting the EU directly on course 
to European Economic and Monetary Union. The provisions of 
the Maastricht Treaty called for a start to stage 2 of the Delors 
plan on January 1 1994 and a start to stage 3 on January 1 1999 
the latest. Besides its monetary policy provisions the Treaty 
includes proposals to harmonize social policy and centralize 
foreign and defense policy decisions within the EU states. The 
Maastricht Treaty officially the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) was signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force 
on 1 November 1993. According to the terms of the Treaty it 
could come into effect only if all EMS members had approved 
that. Doubts emerged in 1992 about its acceptance shown by 
the referendums in Denmark and in France reflecting lack of its 
popular support. When the Treaty had been successfully rati-
fied by all 12 states the process of EMU could begin with Stage 
2 and with the establishment of the European Monetary Insti-
tute (EMI) a temporary institution to oversee transition to stage 
3 in which the ECU, the nucleus of the EMS, the basket of fixed 
amounts of EU currencies, and national currencies were to be 
replaced by the single currency, the euro.
In the following part the different alternative path schemes 
of attaining EMU are discussed. 
As for the strategies, there were two opposing groups repre-
senting views on how to achieve Monetary Union. According to 
the „monetarists” progress in monetary field would be followed 
by a coordination of economic policies effectively (Tsoulka-
lis, 1977) while the other group, the „economists”, believed 
that harmonization of economic policies had the priority (De 
Grauwe, 1990). The difference in views generated debates 
around Maastricht at the beginning of the 90s. As for the timeta-
ble of adoption the gradualist approach has a specified schedule 
with criteria to enter the next stage, the „Hawaiian” approach 
meant a „shock –therapy” referring to the way Hawaii became 
a state of the US in a single step. The latter was supported by 
some leading economists though it had hardly any feasibility 
in Europe (Giovannini, 1990). The Delors report (1989) exem-
plified the „monetarist”, gradualist approach. The convergence 
approach that set entry conditions, the convergence criteria, for 
member states to move to stage 3 and the use of the ERM to 
reduce volatility until exchange rates could be fixed before a 
single currency could be adopted is referred to the Maastricht 
approach (Artus, 1993). The other possible path to Monetary 
Union is the „Hard ECU” (Brittan, 2003), the theory of Hayek 
(1984) on concurrent circulation of currencies put forward in 
the U.K., according to which the speed of replacement of the 
national currencies by individuals for the ECU is determined 
by economic behaviour (Siegel, 1984). This way of transition 
does not involve an „end game” meaning a specified time and 
entry condition. Having shown the different route to EMU, the 
paper will focus on EMS and its ERM so that it can address the 
Monetary Union when the problems within the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism have been examined. The Maastricht approach will 
be discussed in more detail later in this paper.
3 Exchange rate stability within the ERM 
from 1979 to 1987
Exchange rate stability has particular importance in Europe 
due to the high reliance of the European economies on inter-
national trade illustrated by high degree of their openness, 
import plus export as a percent of GDP. As a result depreciation 
or appreciation does much damage to their economies such as 
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inflation unemployment or weakening competitiveness. The sta-
bility of exchange rates was regarded as a prerequisite to mone-
tary union. The first eight years of the ERM (from 1979 to 1987) 
were characterized by realignments of exchange rates. Each cur-
rency participating in the system had a central rate relative to the 
ECU, a basket composed of specific quantities of the currencies 
of European Monetary System members depending on the rela-
tive economic weight of the country. According to the terms of 
the ERM the nominal market exchange rate of each ERM cur-
rency was required to be kept vis-à-vis any other ERM currency 
within 2.25 percent (for the Italian lira 6 percent) bands on each 
side of the bilateral central parities. These fluctuation margins 
served as mandatory intervention limits for each central bank, 
which could stabilize European exchange rates (Giavazzi and 
Giovannini, 1989). Inflation rate differentials, however, made it 
necessary for the rates to be realigned. There were 11 realign-
ments in that period (European Economy, 1993). Germany, due 
to the commitment of the Bundesbank to price stability, which 
was the predominant goal of German monetary policy, was the 
centre of the strong currency zone with low inflation. Countries 
with strong currencies managed to remain in the German mark 
stability zone and could avoid devaluing their currencies against 
the German currency. Realignments were necessary for high 
inflation countries to prevent real exchange rates of weak cur-
rencies from increasing and their competitiveness from weaken-
ing. This type of a fixed-but-adjustable exchange rate system 
developed into a de facto fixed-rate system by the early 1990s as 
there were no realignments between 1987 and 1992. The infla-
tion rates of the weak currency countries had been lowered by 
the late 1980s (International Monetary Fund data). The weak 
currency countries’ aversion to devaluation stemmed from the 
general view that it was regarded as a sign of weak economy and 
faulty economic policy, which strengthened their central banks’ 
commitment to lowering inflation. Accomplishing the goal of 
low inflation made devaluation unnecessary.  In the ERM prac-
tice the German mark had become the „inflation anchor” of the 
system. The Bundesbank pursued monetary policies according 
to the requirements of internal balance, when a conflict emerged 
– payment surplus, appreciating mark with inflationary pressure 
– Germany opted for tight money to prevent inflation; the Bun-
desbank pursued its own preferences. The other ERM countries 
had to give priority to external balance that is stabilizing their 
exchange rates and keep balance of payment equilibrium, and 
use monetary policies, tightening or easing, according to that. 
The system had all the signs of a currency area anchored to the 
mark and German monetary policy, which was too tight for the 
other member states (Mundell, 1994).
4 The Gains for the Members 
in the German-Dominated System
To understand the gains of the EMS two approaches can be 
used. The interest of the inflation-prone members in the system 
can be explained by the monetary discipline hypothesis. On 
the other hand the strategic cooperation is essential in under-
standing Germany’s remaining in the system (Melitz, 1988). 
They suggest the system benefit all the members. The monetary 
discipline theory alone does not explain the interest of Ger-
many, while coordinated policies according to game theory do 
not elucidate German dominance. To put it differently, it was 
worthwhile for countries with high inflation to join a system in 
which they could benefit from linking their currencies to that of 
a country with low inflation. A central bank that has committed 
itself to a credible strategy of disinflation faces a lower inflation 
rate and earns reputation in the market place. Within the EMS 
the countries with relative high inflation such as France and 
Italy borrowed reputation from low-inflation Germany (Fra-
tianni, 1988). The real exchange rate of high-inflation coun-
tries appreciated and realignments returned them to their initial 
value. An increase in their exchange rates would have impaired 
the competitiveness of goods produced in the weak currency 
countries causing a decline in their exports resulting in trade 
deficits. ERM countries that were able to match the German 
performance in controlling inflation comprise the strong cur-
rency zone of the system. Pegging currencies to the Deutsche 
mark (DM) was the most important means for importing cred-
ibility. The Bundesbank had made price stability the predomi-
nant goal of German monetary policy mainly due to the det-
rimental economic and political consequences of the German 
hyperinflation of the 1920s. The gains for Germany derived 
from the integration of European financial markets, which 
would make Germany less vulnerable to changes in foreign 
economic policy. With exchange controls relaxed in Italy and 
France the substitutability between DM denominated assets 
and those denominated in French franks and in liras increased. 
Melitz also analysed why Germany wished to stay in the system 
and demonstrated it by standard applications of game theory. 
Strategic cooperation did not explain the tightness of monetary 
policy, but suggested Germany could increase its competitive-
ness by disinflating between realignments which resulted from 
keeping nominal exchange rates stable while inflation rates had 
not fully converged yet. Melitz argues these gains outweighed 
the costs of German monetary policy, moreover these advan-
tages proved secure and more durable than those of other mem-
bers pursuing disinflation through the system. Fratianni (1988) 
also addresses the gains of Germany in the EMS and concludes 
the system made it possible for the DM to have smaller real 
appreciations than would have been under free floating. Ger-
many’s joining the EMS opposed by the Bundesbank may have 
been justified by this advantage and it seems to have expressed 
the intention of the German government to find a scheme 
against speculative flow as the main motive (Brittan, 1979). 
The Very Short-term Financing Facility (VSTFF) was available 
for compulsory intervention in unlimited amounts. The creditor 
bank had to face exchange risk since claims and liabilities were 
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denominated in ECU in the VSTFF. The Bundesbank suffered 
a loss of over 1 billion DM in its VSTFF to sustain the lira 
and the pound (Collignon, 1994). The Facility was designed to 
provide aid for temporary short term balance of payment needs 
and to defend the exchange rates against speculative attacks 
when they were to leave the fluctuation margin. The change 
of rules of intervention and the access automatic credit facili-
ties through VSTFF in 1987 was encouraged by France after 
its refusing intervention for the franc on the intervention floor, 
which eventually had to be done by the Bundesbank. The modi-
fication of rules was interpreted as the discretion given to Ger-
many to decide in each case. Extension of credit through the 
Facility was limited by the number of currencies under attack 
at the same time.
5 The Evolution of the New ERM
Since inflation rates in the weak currency members had been 
lowered to the rates of the strong currency countries, and due 
to the stigma devaluation meant to one country there were no 
realignments between January 1987 and 1992. Strong currency 
was associated with economic strength and prudent national 
economic policies. The aversion to devaluation relative to the 
Deutche mark strengthened the central banks’ commitment 
to low inflation and placed the strong domestic currency in 
the centre of the economic policy. French inflation e.g. was 
reduced from an average rate of 11 percent to an average of 3.5 
percent by this strategy from the early 1980s to the late (Cadot, 
1996). The success of this strategy made further devaluations 
unnecessary. National pride transformed the system from 
fixed-but-adjustable to a fixed rate system. The Single Euro-
pean Act of 1986 set removal of all remaining trade barriers 
within the European Community. The Act includes provisions 
concerning free flow of capital (Council Directive 88/361 
EEC, 1988 June 24). The Commission sought to abolish the 
general arrangements for restrictions on capital movements 
i.e. all the operations carried out either by a natural or legal 
person. Capital movement includes direct investments, invest-
ment in property, operations in securities, current and deposit 
accounts, financial loans and credit with effect from July 1, 
1990 until December 31 1992. Spain and Ireland were given 
an extension to 1992, Portugal and Greece to 1995. Capital 
controls were essential to decrease the downward pressure on 
the weak currency countries’ exchange rates before they were 
able to lower their inflation rates (Giavazzi and Giovannini, 
1989). This policy instrument made it possible for the EMS 
countries to limit exchange rate volatility and reach a conver-
gence in inflation rates to that of the strong currency members. 
Capital controls enabled central banks to intervene in currency 
markets more successfully owing to insulated domestic credit 
markets from increases in interest rate. Single Europe assumes 
free mobility of capital.  Countries could have allowed it to 
themselves if they had been protected against the effects of 
free capital mobility. The success of the EMS during the 1980s 
was mainly ensured by capital controls supporting the mem-
bers in achieving their goals of stabilizing the exchange rates 
and converging inflation rates toward the rate in the strong cur-
rency zone. Removing this instrument with fix exchange rates 
retained meant losing the prospect of achieving the objectives 
of convergence. Exchange rate stability could be maintained 
with full convergence. What was created was irreconcilable. 
If monetary policy aims to achieve domestic goals, the goal 
of limiting exchange rate fluctuations should be forfeited. 
The pursuit of one economic goal often restricts obtaining the 
other. As long as capital controls were maintained, they served 
as another tool to attain the other goal. Simply put, an eco-
nomic policy instrument can serve only one goal. Being forced 
to choose between two economic policy objectives or using 
one policy instrument and trying to achieve two goals leads 
to tensions that cannot be maintained even in the short run. In 
other words it resulted in instability and can be assessed as the 
system’s flaw. Partly due to recognizing the unsustainability 
of that state, the members put the transformation of the EMS 
into a full monetary union on agenda according to the recom-
mendation of the Delors Report. The signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992 set a timetable for adopting a single currency 
scheduled January 1 1999 the latest. It suggested to investors 
to choose portfolios on the high yield currencies, such as the 
Italian lira regarding the exchange risk it incurs, without hav-
ing to be exposed to the risk in fact due to the expectable con-
vergence of economic performance within EMS countries. The 
timetable set in Maastricht indicated no occurrence of devalu-
ations in the period of moving to the single currency. Such 
investor moves were termed as „convergence plays”. Bond 
markets were also affected by convergence phenomenon. In 
anticipation of monetary union peripheral bond markets (Ital-
ian and Spanish) were rising strongly. So were markets in Ire-
land, Sweden and Finland. If markets believed a country would 
join EMU, it seemed to be reasonable for the country to align 
its long-term bond yields with those of Germany- the lowest 
denominator. The odd trend in capital markets resulted in an 
impressive narrowing of the premium on Italian and Spanish 
bonds over those of Germany (Borio and McCauley, 1996). In 
other words the cost of Italian and Spanish government debt 
fell, which had little to do with economic fundamentals rather 
with forcing the monetary union within the set timetable. Tech-
nological improvements and new products and services in the 
financial field facilitated capital flows increasing the degree of 
international capital mobility (Miller, 1992). Fund flows were 
based on the belief in convergence of economic policies and 
performance within the EMS adding a high degree of vulnera-
bility to the new ERM. One direction flows may take a reverse 
any time if belief is doubted. These dangers were ignored. The 
doubts emerged in connection with the German reunification 
and about the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.
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6 The Crisis of the New ERM
German reunification in 1990 caused strains in the EMS. 
The costs associated with the reunification were financed 
through borrowing of the German government turning the 
budget surplus of the previous year to a deficit of $150 bil-
lion (Clausen and Willms 1994). The large current account 
surplus in the balance of trade rapidly turned into a deficit as 
the complement to the import of foreign capital necessary to 
finance unification. This turn was accompanied by remarkable 
changes in exchange rates, which made real appreciation of 
the Deutsche mark necessary against other ERM currencies to 
furnish the current account deficit. The German government’s 
proposal to realignment was rejected mainly by France with 
regard of „franc fort” economic policy of France. To reach the 
real appreciation of its currency Germany had to have infla-
tion higher than its trading partners. Expansionary fiscal policy 
and sudden increase in monetary growth following the reuni-
fication caused higher inflation, too. The restrictive monetary 
policy the Bundesbank applied as a response to inflation threat 
resulted in a massive interest rate increase, from 7.1 percent 
in 1989 to 9.5 percent in 1992 (Clausen and Willms 1994). 
Higher German interest rates required other EMS countries to 
keep interest rates higher than it would have been favourable 
for them to achieve their domestic macroeconomic objectives. 
Since the domestic priorities were different in Germany and 
in the other EMS countries doubts arose in the member states 
whether it was worth defending the exchange rates by giv-
ing up their own goals. Doubts around the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty made the assumption of no devaluation less 
likely. High inflation countries such as Italy experienced a real 
exchange rate appreciation and suffered deterioration in their 
competitiveness producing large current account deficits after 
the last realignment in 1987. The downward pressure on the 
lira was strengthened by the reverse of „convergence plays” 
and speculation on devaluation. The British pound was con-
sidered overvalued and became attacked. The strong interven-
tion of the central banks the pound and the lira were forced 
to be withdrawn from the regime followed by devaluation of 
the Spanish peseta, the Portuguese escudo and the Irish pound. 
The new ERM had come to the first stage of the crisis. The 
second stage began with lowering interest rates in member 
states due to recession in Europe. As long as it could be done 
at the same pace as Germany eased its policy the members 
could avoid weakening their currencies. The priority of the 
German economic policy was to reduce inflation. The main 
concern in other EC countries was unemployment. Maintain-
ing fixed exchange rates required single monetary policy. 
Reducing unemployment is far beyond having only economic 
implications. Exchange rates had to be abandoned in favour of 
domestic goals. Despite massive interventions of the central 
banks the attempt of keeping EMS exchange rates within nar-
row bands had to be given up. Narrow bands were replaced 
by a system with 15 percent ranges on each side referred to 
as de facto floating.  Although wide bands were considered 
temporary no agreement indicated a return to narrow bands or 
supported its feasibility.
7 Lack of a Control Mechanism, 
Lack of an Automatic Insurance Mechanism
The defects of the system made it less likely for the new 
ERM to avert the crisis by avoiding mistaken economic poli-
cies. Better policies, such as Germany’s conducting a less 
expansionary fiscal policy to reduce the inflationary impacts of 
reunification, the French government’s accepting Germany’s 
proposal for a realignment in 1990 when there was a need for 
real appreciation of the Deutsche mark to finance unification 
by the import of foreign capital, flexibility of the other EMS 
partners in devaluing their currencies when the German pro-
posal arose, Bundesbank’s lowering inflation rates to adjust 
to the domestic goals of the other members, could have been 
opted for. Correct policies are likely to have impacted the  tim-
ing or the character or intensity, but unlikely to have altered 
the outcome significantly since the system was fragile. Mun-
dell compares the EMS to the unanchored dollar system, a dol-
lar standard, set up at the Smithsonian Institution in 1971. It 
was characterized by the United States’ dominance in deter-
mining the inflation rate for the whole currency area reflect-
ing its own monetary policy preferences. In that regime the 
policy of the United States (the inner or center country) lay 
on its self-discipline with no accountability of convertibility 
while the other countries (the outer countries) were disciplined 
by their balance of payments. To put it differently the other 
countries had no means to make US monetary policy different. 
The crisis emerged when the inflation preferences conflicted 
and ended up in the partial breakup of the dollar standard. In 
the ERM, which had become a mark standard in the 1980s, 
Germany, the center country, pursued its own monetary policy 
with its domestic inflation preferences lacking any accounta-
bility mechanism while the outer countries were disciplined by 
the balance of payments under fixed exchange rates and had no 
influence on German monetary policy.  The flaw of both stand-
ards was that the monetary policies of the anchor countries 
were not in line with the goals of the member states of their 
regimes. The two regimes were different in size. Size is a main 
determinant of the ability of the center to cushion shocks in 
the system. Germany, qua anchor, one-third the size of the US 
economy was one-third as stable. (Mundell, 1994) Both stand-
ards lacked the control mechanism that enables partner states to 
affect the monetary policy of the center thus that of the whole 
currency area. By contrast the control of the anchored dollar 
system of Bretton Woods rested on both the partners: on one 
hand on US monetary policy, on the other hand on gold-dollar 
portfolio of Europe. The gold-dollar portfolio functioned as 
the other control variable. In practice European dollar into 
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gold moves weakened the US reserve position and forced a 
monetary contraction whereas gold conversion into dollars 
strengthened the US reserve position and stimulated or com-
pelled a monetary expansion (Mundell, 1994). The stability of 
the system was determined by the control mechanism built in 
it. Control mechanism should work automatically. In the case 
of the European Monetary Union the analogy lies in the lack 
of a mechanism working automatically, which would be essen-
tial for its stability. Automatic means self-regulating thus the 
system sustains itself without having to be regulated by mak-
ing the rules stricter. The subject of the comparison is quite 
different in the case of Europe since it refers to an automatic 
insurance mechanism with a centralized budget transferring 
resources to deficit countries in times of crisis, which could 
be accomplished only in the frame of a political union (Melitz 
and Zummer, 1999). The design of the euro-zone rejected any 
form of automatic insurance mechanism to avoid the risk of 
moral hazard i.e. governments’ capitalizing on an insurance 
mechanism to create excessive debts and deficits. Such a polit-
ical union will be necessary to sustain the monetary union in 
the long run. As long as the member states are unwilling to 
move to that direction, the system remains fragile (De Grauwe, 
1992). In order to get a better understanding of the lack of an 
automatic mechanism of this kind and the impracticability of 
the political union with the current state of affairs, the route to 
the Monetary Union devised in Maastricht has to be examined 
and an assessment of the Treaty has to be given.
8 The Route to EMU according 
to the Maastricht Approach
The examination addresses the issues as follows in nutshell: 
fiscal federalism, convergence, currency stabilization and some 
aspects of the operation of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
8.1 Fiscal federalism
Literature discussing fiscal federalism defines it as assig-
nation of expenditure and tax/transfer competences to differ-
ent government levels (Oates, 1999). To apply it to Monetary 
Union the theory should deal with income redistribution and 
stabilization within a region, and dynamic issues such as dis-
parities and asymmetries while the EMU states move to the 
direction of a federalist structure. It does not. The principle of 
subsidiarity, however, is an important implication for the Union 
according to which a higher government level should assume 
responsibilities that a lower level cannot take care of effec-
tively (The Maastricht Treaty, Article 3b). It implies preferring 
national autonomy in regulation i.e. coordination to harmoniza-
tion or centralization generating a tension between them. Only 
if coordination attempts have failed between member countries 
is harmonization, as a last resort, to turn to. For the imple-
mentation of the subsidiary principle in practice the argument 
can be found in national differences in tastes and needs, better 
democratic control of public services at a national level and 
increased competition and innovation between national author-
ities in supplying public goods and services in a decentralized 
way (Courchene et al., 1993). Since the degree of free mobility 
of labour is insufficient despite the implementation of the sin-
gle market due to cultural and linguistic differences the third 
argument arises doubts. Literature identifies cases for assigning 
competences other than principle of subsidiarity such as spillo-
ver effects of national policies, economies of scale, national 
policies are indivisible, the pursuit of homogeneity or fairness 
(Plender, 1991). The homogeneity argument, which is referred 
to as national standards in Canada, raised debates in Europe on 
European Commission’s initiating directives on areas it had no 
competence instead of following the subsidiarity principle. It 
is the field of disparities of the regions where the principle of 
subsidiarity could trouble the Monetary Union. The economic 
principle of fiscal federalism, the resource flow principle, justi-
fies the political tensions stemming from gaining and losing 
in the structure. Mature federations can be characterized by a 
significant degree of expenditure and revenue centralization. 
In a federalist structure regional disparities may be expected 
to diminish through the resources’ flowing from the wealthier 
to the poorer members. The level of acceptance of resource 
flow in general and in regional income redistribution might 
be much higher in federations such as the USA, Australia or 
Canada owing to linguistic and cultural similarities and factor 
mobility in comparison with the European Union. The degree 
of political homogeneity cannot be neglected even if economic 
benefits in terms of an increase in overall welfare have been 
obviously shown. Courchene et al (1993) revealed an inverse 
relationship between the public finance autonomy of a mem-
ber state and interregional redistribution due to the fact that 
interregional redistribution capacity depends on the size of the 
federal budget relative to the budget of member states (other 
things being equal). A federation creates recipients and provid-
ers (winners and loosers respectively) referred to as the issue of 
fairness. In the European Union budgetary fairness i.e. beliefs 
concerning the procedural and distributive justice of the supra-
national budgetary process has always been a major issue in 
terms of net contribution to the EU. I assume fairness may 
affect the commitment of the state depending not only on the 
fairness of the budgeting process rather on the fairness of the 
budget target assigned.
8.2 Convergence under Maastricht
The Maastricht convergence criteria were set for individual 
countries with a double purpose in terms of moving to stage 3 
of the Delors plan. Economies were bound to maintain a con-
vergent pathway with respect of both monetary and fiscal poli-
cies. The criteria indicated national governments’ participating 
in end games, facilitated a smooth transition period and were 
agreeable in complementing the stability of exchange rates 
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foreseen for the EMS. To the date the convergence criteria were 
specified practically no member state was eligible in terms of 
meeting the criteria [see De Grauwe and Gros (1991)], even in 
April 1995 out of 12 member states only Ireland and Luxem-
bourg met all four criteria, while Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain met none of them (EMI, 1996). The Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) Article 109j states that the Commission and the EMI 
shall report to the Council on the fulfillment of the obligations 
of the Member States regarding the achievement of economic 
and monetary union and on the degree of convergence with 
respect of price stability, the government financial position, cur-
rency stabilization and the durability of convergence reflected 
in the long-term interest rate levels. According to Article 109 
indent 3 Member States should observe “the normal fluctua-
tion margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mechanism of 
the European Monetary System, for at least two years without 
devaluing against the currency of any other Member State”. 
“Normal fluctuation margins” meant +/- 2.25 percent at the 
time that the Treaty was signed. Following the currency crisis 
in the ERM in 1993 the fluctuation margins for all the curren-
cies in the system were widened to 15 percent on each side of 
the central parity. The increased width of the fluctuation bands 
facilitated respecting the limits as well as meeting the Treaty’s 
additional requirement that the member state has not devalued 
its currency’s bilateral central rate against any other member 
state currency “on its own initiative for the same period.” To 
assess the degree of European monetary integration it is nec-
essary to define the term “convergence”. Collignon (1994) 
suggests measuring the system in terms of the Maastricht con-
vergence criteria themselves as they qualify the state entering 
the monetary union termed as the political approach while 
defining convergence in terms of “purchasing power theory” 
(PPP) referred to as the economic approach.(Leydessdorff, 
1999). Measured by Maastricht standards the system seems to 
have converged in terms of inflation rates, interest rates, fis-
cal deficits and nominal exchange rates. This monetary inte-
gration process ended up in adopting the single currency, the 
euro, implying a system of fixed nominal exchange rates. On 
the other hand based on information theory (Shannon, 1948) 
Leydesdorff concludes that defining convergence as contribu-
tions to system formation countries that introduced a floating 
or strongly fluctuating nominal exchange rate regime following 
the currency crisis in 1992-1993 failed to converge in nominal 
terms, but performed better in terms of real convergence. They 
contributed to the formation of a system at the economic level 
more than those with monetary regimes linked strongly to that 
of Germany. Consequently monetary integration does not obvi-
ously include economic integration. According to the theory 
of optimum currency areas [(OCA), Mundell, 1961)] sufficient 
real wage flexibility and labour mobility can compensate for 
real divergences. The lack of those in Europe makes it less 
likely that the requirements of a sound monetary union can be 
met. In addition market efficiency with prices fully reflecting 
available information has not been constituted by the European 
Union, which also suggests that monetary integration does not 
imply economic integration. Maastricht has brought the loss of 
two economic policy levers, monetary and exchange rate poli-
cies, and has left two other, the national fiscal policies and the 
EU budget itself. It means national governments are restrained 
in reacting to asymmetric shocks, the outcome of which 
depends to a great extent on the relative phasing of business 
cycles between each member state and on the ability that cycles 
can be responded through the EU budget. Since monetary sov-
ereignty and exchange rate tool are no longer accessible fiscal 
latitude is needed for the members to treat shocks, particularly 
in an environment where labour migration has failed to func-
tion as a valve for dealing with asymmetric shocks.
8.3 Currency stabilization and using 
the ERM to achieve EMU
Article 109j indent 3 about the normal fluctuation margins 
of +/- 2.25 percent implied by the Treaty at the time when it 
was signed served the objective of ensuring that the currency 
of member state joining EMU was at a sustainable level for a 
longer period of time. Fiscal, monetary and exchange rate crite-
ria seem to have been incongruous with the objectives of EMU 
taking all aspects into account. On occurrence of transitory 
shocks the expected time preceding entry into stage 3 could 
lengthen and foreign exchange markets became turbulent. 
The response of central banks to the turbulences exacerbated 
the situation in economic criteria terms and affected expecta-
tions. Due to the narrow space for manoeuvring in the foreign 
exchange market transitory shocks could permanently modify 
expectations. The room for manoeuvring was further limited 
proportionally by the weight of the currency in the ECU basket 
given the ERM operated around the ECU, a weighted basket of 
the EMS currencies. The adjustable peg exchange rate system 
which could work effectively in reducing volatility may not 
have been the right way in moving towards EMU on a pathway 
set by criteria.
8.4 Some aspects of the operation of the ECB
Central Bank independence is a priority for Maastricht. The Bun-
desbank in Frankfurt became the de facto central bank of Europe 
and by pegging their currencies to the Deutsche mark EMS mem-
ber states had to follow the German monetary policy in which they 
had no formal say. Independence enabled the Bank to maintain a 
strong DM and it consistently refused to loosen its monetary policy 
to ease exchange rate pressure on its partners. The Germans argued 
that the independent ECB could not operate in a vacuum meaning 
that a central bank had to have a governmental framework to oper-
ate in. The lack of an equivalent institution in fiscal matters results in 
a lack of proper interaction between monetary and fiscal policy on 
European level. The lack of synchronized business cycles has been 
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a problem since there is only one central bank with one monetary 
policy to fit all the members and has generally followed a monetary 
policy that makes sense for Germany.
9 Summary and Conclusions
The process of the European economic integration starting 
with the establishment of the European Economic Community 
(EC) in 1958 can be considered successful. Between 1958 and 
1972 the intra EC trade increased from approximately 30% to 
over 50% of the total international trade of the six member coun-
tries, the EC share in the world trade increased from 21.9% to 
29.8%, while the trade share of the USA dropped from 16.3% to 
11.7% (Salvatore, 2001). After a period of a stagnating intra-EC 
trade in the total world trade and a decreasing intra- EC trade as 
a percent to EC output in the mid 80s the Treaty of Rome was 
amended with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, which 
gave a new moving force to the European integration process. 
By the beginning of 1993 a European Single Market had evolved 
with all remaining barriers removed to the free flow of goods, 
services and resources among members. SEA implied unifying 
national production standards, abolishing differences in all taxes 
and unifying the European financial markets through slacken-
ing national capital movements’ control. The Maastricht crite-
ria on monetary union include low inflation and interest rates, 
exchange rate stability, public deficits below 3 percent and gov-
ernment debt no higher than 60 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct. Since only Germany, France and Luxembourg were to fulfill 
the criteria by the end of 1996 the chance for a fast track mon-
etary union was abandoned and the launch date was set to 1999.
In contrast with the successes of the Customs Union and the 
Single Market the history of creating European Monetary Union 
cannot be considered that successful since attempts had failed. 
The Werner Plan approved in 1971 proposed the irrevocable fix-
ing of exchange rates and the adoption of a single currency until 
1980. The plan failed due to the pressures of the USA and the 
crisis of 1971-73. The strategy of a monetary union was sus-
tained by the EC member states. Progress was made in stabiliz-
ing exchange rate relations between their currencies on the basis 
of the Basel agreement “snake in the tunnel”, and in 1972 the 
fluctuation margin among EC currencies was fixed at 2.25%. 
The plan failed when participating currencies (British, French, 
Italian and Irish) had left the system. Despite these failures the 
European Monetary System (EMS) was established in 1979. 
This paper has shown how the EMS and its Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) worked, how the “new ERM” evolved and 
how its crisis emerged. The question arises whether the ERM 
crisis could have been averted. I conclude that without funda-
mental changes the crisis in 1993 could not have been avoided 
since the new ERM was intrinsically susceptible to shocks. The 
main argument for all monetary union plans was to curb infla-
tion, the big enemy. In this respect the EMS functioned well 
through providing credibility and discipline to countries with 
high inflation as paper presented. However, disinflation argu-
ment is not justified by the fact that Italian, Spanish, Portuguese 
and UK inflation continued to fall after they had left the ERM 
in September 1992. The lessons from the past might help to find 
the way ahead.  Why not drop the obsession on price stability 
for instance and let inflation go as a possible way out now?
The EMS, however, should have laid the groundwork for mon-
etary union in the 21st century. Actually it could not. The only way 
out of the vicious circle that evolved and resulted in the crisis of 
the EMS was the way out of ERM. The ERM crisis in August 
1993 led to adopting new large fluctuation margins (+/- 15%) 
of participating currencies.  The route to monetary union was 
envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty as a time-specified, gradualist 
approach. Coupling demanding economic convergence criteria 
with a rigid timetable for fulfilling them surrounded by a cha-
otic environment of divided institutional responsibility among 
the European Monetary Institute (EMI) and national monetary 
authorities was a big structural flaw in the EMS. Consequently 
fundamentally sound currencies came under attack before and 
after the French referendum on the Treaty. As for currency sta-
bilization, within the Maastricht formula a transitory shock that 
may lengthen the period of time expected before entry into stage 
3 of EMU could cause turbulences in the foreign exchange mar-
kets. Due to the economic criteria central bank response such as 
increasing interest rates might only worsen the situation caus-
ing that expectations could be affected permanently. On the 
other hand the use of the ERM of the EMS, an adjustable peg 
exchange rate regime effectively used as an independent mecha-
nism to reduce volatility to attain Monetary Union is incompat-
ible with a criteria dependent dynamic process.
This paper offers an approach of examining the route to EMU 
to reveal the implications that the monetary union still has to 
bear. Facing the past may help design the future. The mistakes of 
the past and measures taken hastily under pressure just to avoid 
an even bigger trouble can hardly bring a sustainable settlement. 
To be concrete the problems and the economic and political ten-
sions within the EMS made it intrinsically susceptible to shocks. 
I cannot say that the turbulence within the ERM was due to an 
unfortunate coincidence and influence of independent events 
although they were to blame for that. In this paper I have tried to 
form a consistent framework for the events and other factors and 
destabilizing elements that contributed to the crisis of the ERM 
and impacted the pathway to EMU. The monetary integration 
process which was dramatically accelerated following the EMR 
crisis resulted in the Maastricht approach to monetary union with 
all its doubts. Efforts should have been concentrated on reform-
ing the EMS rather than moving fast to monetary union.
I do not say that the crisis of the euro-zone was caused by the 
flaws of the ERM. What I say is that instead of blaming the global 
economic and financial crisis for the bad state of the euro-zone the 
groundwork should be examined thoroughly to know better how to 
keep the building in existence
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